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PREGNANCY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Helen Norton*
INTRODUCTION
Suppose that you are pregnant and seated in the waiting room of a Planned
Parenthood clinic, or maybe in a facility that advertises “Pregnant? We Can
Help You.” This Essay discusses the First Amendment rules that apply to
the government’s control of what you are about to hear.
If the government funds your clinic’s program, the U.S. Supreme Court
has held that it does not violate the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause
when it forbids your health-care provider from offering information about
available abortion services to you1 (and even if you ask that provider about
the availability of abortion services, you will be told only that “the project
does not consider abortion [to be] an appropriate method of family
planning”2). Nor, according to the Court, does the Free Speech Clause
require the government to inform you that it has forbidden the program’s
health-care providers from discussing abortion services with you.
Nor does the government violate the Free Speech Clause, the Court has
held, when it requires your doctor (regardless of whether she works in a
program funded by the government) to tell you about “the availability of
printed materials published by the State describing the fetus and providing
information about medical assistance for childbirth, information about child
support from the father, and a list of agencies which provide adoption and
other services as alternatives to abortion.”3 In other words, the government
can require doctors to discourage you from having an abortion.
On the other hand, the Court has held that the government probably does
violate the Free Speech Clause when it requires unlicensed facilities offering
pregnancy-related medical services like ultrasounds to disclose that they are
unlicensed (because they do not employ health-care professionals).4 And the
government probably also violates the Free Speech Clause, according to the
* Rothgerber Chair in Constitutional Law, University of Colorado School of Law. Thanks to
the Fordham Law Review for its excellent work in hosting Fordham University School of
Law’s 2018 Symposium, Equality and the First Amendment: A Symposium Celebrating 100
Years of Women. For an overview of the Symposium, see Jeanmarie Fenrich, Benjamin C.
Zipursky & Danielle Keats Citron, Foreword: Gender Equality and the First Amendment,
87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313 (2019).
1.
2.
3.
4.

See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196–200 (1991).
See id. at 180 (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(5)).
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881, 884 (1992).
See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2378 (2018).

2417

2418

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

Court, when it requires licensed health-care facilities whose “primary
purpose” is “providing family planning or pregnancy-related services” to tell
you that the state offers free or low-cost comprehensive pregnancy-related
services, including prenatal care, contraception, and abortion.5
These are the First Amendment rules, the Court tells us, for the
government’s control of speech to pregnant women who seek pregnancyrelated services. But these holdings fail to consider the pregnant women’s
First Amendment interests as listeners. Rather, the Court focuses on the
government’s interests in speaking to pregnant women, or on the interests of
the speakers regulated by the government.6 But free speech theory and
doctrine have long recognized that the First Amendment protects listeners’,
as well as speakers’, democratic self-governance, enlightenment, and
autonomy interests.7 And for this reason, law sometimes protects speech
because it furthers listeners’ interests and sometimes regulates speech that
threatens those interests.8 This Essay considers what First Amendment law,
as applied to speech to pregnant women, would look like if the Court attended
to the First Amendment interests of pregnant women themselves.9
I. PREGNANT WOMEN (AND OTHER LISTENERS) HAVE FIRST AMENDMENT
INTERESTS IN KNOWING WHEN THE GOVERNMENT IS SPEAKING TO THEM
The government itself often provides health-care services, and often it
funds others to provide health-care services. And health-care services almost
always require speech between providers and their patients. When the
government speaks itself, or when it funds others to deliver its speech, the
Court has held that the government may control the content of that message.10
And that makes sense because the government’s speech is not only
inevitable, but also often of great value to its listeners. Governments must
5. Id. at 2375 (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123471(a)).
6. Note too these rules’ viewpoint-based skew. See id. at 2388 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“[A] Constitution that allows States to insist that medical providers tell women about the
possibility of adoption should also allow States similarly to insist that medical providers tell
women about the possibility of abortion.”).
7. See Toni M. Massaro & Helen Norton, Siri-ously? Free Speech Rights and Artificial
Intelligence, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1169, 1175–82 (2016) (explaining how free speech theory
and doctrine protect speech in part to serve listeners’ interests).
8. See infra Conclusion.
9. This Essay focuses on the First Amendment issues raised by the government’s
content-based control of speech to pregnant women by providers that offer pregnancy-related
services. It does not discuss the different First Amendment issues raised by the government’s
content-neutral control of speech to pregnant women outside those facilities. See McCullen v.
Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 493–97 (2014) (striking down a statute that restricted individuals from
standing on public ways and sidewalks within thirty-five feet of reproductive health care
facilities’ entrances and driveways); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 730 (2000) (upholding a
statute that restricted individuals from approaching within eight feet of another person within
one-hundred feet of health-care facilities’ entrances); Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc.,
512 U.S. 753, 771 (1994) (upholding a targeted injunction that restricted individuals from
“congregating, picketing, patrolling, demonstrating, or entering” within thirty-six feet of
reproductive health care clinic entrances and driveways, but striking down the injunction’s
three-hundred-foot buffer zone).
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speak in order to govern and to offer an array of services, including healthcare services. By revealing the government’s priorities to the public, that
speech serves the public’s interest as listeners by adding to the marketplace
of ideas and information and by facilitating democratic self-governance.
But there is no constitutional value, and great constitutional danger, in the
government’s failure to disclose the governmental source of its messages to
its listeners. The Court has yet to recognize this, to listeners’ detriment.11
More specifically, in Rust v. Sullivan,12 the Court considered a First
Amendment challenge to a federal regulation that forbade federally funded
providers of family planning counseling and referral services (including
Planned Parenthood affiliates and other nonprofit clinics) from discussing
abortion with the pregnant women they served.13 The regulation barred
health-care providers in those federally funded programs from volunteering
information about abortion services to the pregnant women in their care, and
if a pregnant woman asked about those services, the regulation suggested that
the provider simply reply that “the project does not consider abortion [to be]
an appropriate method of family planning.”14 Doctors and other clinic
workers argued that the regulation restricted their speech based on viewpoint
in violation of the Free Speech Clause.
In a 5-4 decision, the Court disagreed. It held that the regulation simply
required “that public funds be spent for the purposes for which they were
authorized.”15 In other words, the majority treated the speech at issue as the
government’s to control because it occurred in a program funded by the
government. To hold otherwise, the majority stated, “would render
numerous Government programs constitutionally suspect. When Congress
established a National Endowment for Democracy to encourage other
countries to adopt democratic principles . . . it was not constitutionally
required to fund a program to encourage competing lines of political
philosophy such as communism and fascism.”16
Although Rust itself makes no mention of the term “government speech,”
the Court would later describe this decision as the beginning of its
government speech doctrine.17 As the Court explained, we need not fear the

11. I have explored related issues at length elsewhere, and this Part draws from that work.
See Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its
Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 28–30 (2009). See generally
HELEN NORTON, THE GOVERNMENT’S SPEECH AND THE CONSTITUTION (Cambridge Univ. Press
forthcoming 2019) (on file with author).
12. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
13. Id. at 177–78.
14. Id. at 180.
15. Id. at 196.
16. Id. at 194.
17. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (“The Court in
Rust did not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the counseling activities of the doctors
under Title X amounted to governmental speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases,
however, we have explained Rust on this understanding. We have said that viewpoint-based
funding decisions can be sustained in instances in which the government is itself the
speaker . . . or instances, like Rust, in which the government ‘used private speakers to transmit
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government’s speech because it remains accountable to political checks:
“[W]hen the government speaks, for instance to promote its own policies or
to advance a particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and
the political process for its advocacy. If the citizenry objects, newly elected
officials later could espouse some different or contrary position.”18 But this
is only true if the public understands speech to be the government’s. And
recognizing a message as being from the government not only permits
listeners to hold the government politically accountable for its expressive
choices, but also permits them to assess the message’s quality and
credibility.19
But the majority in Rust required neither that the government disclose itself
as the source of the speech nor that it disclose that it had restricted a clinic’s
speech to its patient—even though, as the dissent observed, this woman “has
every reason to expect, as do we all, that her physician will not withhold
relevant information regarding the very purpose of her visit. To suggest
otherwise is to engage in uninformed fantasy.”20 Absent disclosure to the
contrary, pregnant women listening to speech delivered by the clinic’s
health-care professionals assume that the speech reflects those professionals’
independent, expert, and unfettered counsel, and they may evaluate the
counseling differently than they would have if they knew that the government
restricted its content. In rejecting the providers’ Free Speech Clause
challenge, the majority emphasized the government’s power to control the
content of the programs that it chooses to fund—but nowhere did the majority
consider the pregnant women’s interests, even though these women were the
recipients of the government’s speech.
In short, the First Amendment wrong here rests not in the content of the
government’s message but instead in the government’s failure to identify
itself as the source of the message to the message’s intended audience:
pregnant women seeking pregnancy-related services who have no reason to
suspect, unless so notified, that the government is controlling the content of
their health-care providers’ speech.
So sometimes the government itself talks to pregnant women—and that
speech can threaten pregnant women’s First Amendment autonomy,
enlightenment, and self-governance interests when the government fails to
specific information pertaining to its own program.’” (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995))).
18. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000).
19. For this reason, as I have urged elsewhere, we should understand the First Amendment
to permit the government to express and control the delivery of its own views on a variety of
matters so long as it discloses itself as the source of the speech. Not only is this disclosure of
great value to listeners, but the government (unlike nongovernmental speakers) has no
constitutionally protected autonomy interests of its own in concealing itself as the source of
speech: the First Amendment (and the rest of the Constitution) protects us from the
government, not vice versa. See generally Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech:
Identifying Expression’s Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587 (2008).
20. Rust, 500 U.S. at 212 n.3, 215 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[T]he speech the Secretary
would suppress is truthful information regarding constitutionally protected conduct of vital
importance to the listener.”).
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disclose itself as the source of the message. But sometimes the government
regulates others’ speech to pregnant women. The next Part examines how
the government’s regulatory choices sometimes frustrate, and sometimes
further, pregnant women’s First Amendment interests as listeners.
II. PREGNANT WOMEN HAVE FIRST AMENDMENT (AS WELL AS
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE) INTERESTS IN RECEIVING SPEECH
THAT INFORMS, BUT DOES NOT UNDULY BURDEN,
THEIR REPRODUCTIVE CHOICES
Because speech to pregnant women about pregnancy-related services
sometimes informs, and sometimes instead interferes with, those listeners’
choices, the government’s control of speech to pregnant women implicates
their free speech interests. But before we turn to the Free Speech Clause,
recall the special Due Process Clause rules that the Court applies to the
government’s regulation of abortion, including the government’s regulation
of speech to pregnant women about abortion.21 In Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,22 the Court purported to reaffirm Roe
v. Wade’s23 holding that a woman’s right to choose an abortion is a
fundamental right under the Due Process Clause.24 As the joint opinion
observed, “Our cases recognize ‘the right of the individual, married or single,
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child.’”25
At the same time, however, the Court created a new, more governmentfriendly test to be applied to the government’s regulation of abortion.26
Normally, the Court applies strict scrutiny to the government’s restriction of
a fundamental right and requires the government to show that the regulation
or law at issue is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
interest—a burden that the government rarely meets.27 But in Casey, a
divided Court applied the new undue burden test, which is more forgiving of
the government than strict scrutiny, to assess the government’s abortion
21. Many thoughtful commentators have explored the Court’s abortion-specific approach
not only to the Due Process Clause but also to the Free Speech Clause interests of health-care
providers as speakers. See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, Abortion Distortions, 71 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1175 (2014); B. Jessie Hill, The First Amendment and the Politics of
Reproductive Health Care, 50 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 103 (2016); Christina E. Wells,
Abortion Counseling as Vice Activity: The Free Speech Implications of Rust v. Sullivan and
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1724 (1995). In this Essay I address instead
the Free Speech Clause interests of pregnant women as listeners.
22. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
23. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
24. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
25. Id. at 851 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)). The “joint opinion”
refers to the opinion jointly written by Justices Anthony Kennedy, Sandra Day O’Connor, and
David Souter that controlled the Court’s holdings in Casey.
26. Id. at 877–78.
27. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387–91 (1978) (applying suspicious
scrutiny to strike down a state law that infringed the fundamental right to marry by denying
marriage licenses to those who did not comply with their child support obligations).
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restrictions.28 Under this test, the government may regulate abortion so long
as it does not pose an “undue burden” to a woman seeking an abortion.29 The
term “undue burden,” the joint opinion explained, “is a shorthand for the
conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable
fetus.”30 The Court applied the undue burden test to uphold a number of
Pennsylvania’s restrictions on abortion, including a twenty-four-hour
waiting requirement that would have been forbidden under Roe’s
framework.31 At the same time, the Casey Court struck down, as unduly
burdening the right to choose to have an abortion, the state’s requirement that
a married woman seeking an abortion provide a signed statement that “she
has notified her spouse that she is about to undergo an abortion.”32
Casey also offered the Court the opportunity to apply its new undue burden
test to the government’s regulation of speech to pregnant women. More
specifically, Pennsylvania’s restrictions on abortion included a requirement
that, at least twenty-four hours before performing an abortion, a doctor
inform the woman
of the nature of the procedure, the health risks of the abortion and of
childbirth, and the “probable gestational age of the unborn child.” The
physician or a qualified nonphysician must inform the woman of the
availability of printed materials published by the State describing the fetus
and providing information about medical assistance for childbirth,
information about child support from the father, and a list of agencies which
provide adoption and other services as alternatives to abortion.33

The Court upheld the state’s control of health-care providers’ speech to
pregnant women and concluded that the Due Process Clause permits the
government to try to persuade women not to have an abortion so long as “the
means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life [are]
calculated to inform the woman’s free choice, not to hinder it.”34
[R]equiring that the woman be informed of the availability of information
relating to fetal development and the assistance available should she decide
to carry the pregnancy to full term is a reasonable measure to ensure an
informed choice, one which might cause the woman to choose childbirth
over abortion. This requirement cannot be considered a substantial obstacle
to obtaining an abortion, and, it follows, there is no undue burden.
....
[T]he right protected by Roe is a right to decide to terminate a
pregnancy free of undue interference by the State. Because the informed

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 884–88.
Id. at 887.
Id. at 881.
Id. at 877–78.
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consent requirement facilitates the wise exercise of that right, it cannot be
classified as an interference with the right Roe protects.35

In so holding, the joint opinion suggested that the government’s interests in
controlling the speech of health-care providers aligned with pregnant
women’s interests as listeners:
It cannot be questioned that psychological well-being is a facet of health.
Nor can it be doubted that most women considering an abortion would
deem the impact of the fetus relevant, if not dispositive, to the decision. In
attempting to ensure that a woman apprehend the full consequences of her
decision, the State furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that
a woman may elect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating
psychological consequences, that her decision was not fully informed. If
the information the State requires to be made available to the woman is
truthful and not misleading, the requirement may be permissible.36

In short, the Court held that the government does not violate a woman’s Due
Process Clause right to seek an abortion when it tries to persuade her not to
choose an abortion so long as its speech does not pose an undue burden.
In Casey, the Court focused on the Due Process Clause implications of the
government’s control of speech to pregnant women and quickly disposed of
the Free Speech Clause claims brought by the doctors compelled to deliver
the state’s script.37 In so doing, the Court stated that, “[t]o be sure, the
physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated . . . but only
as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and
regulation by the State.”38 In other words, according to the Court,
Pennsylvania’s restrictions fell within the government’s longstanding
regulation of professionals’ speech to protect their patients and clients.
Certainly that is true of doctors’ speech to their pregnant patients that
explains the benefits and the risks of both abortion and childbirth. But
Pennsylvania required doctors to talk about more than those options’ medical
benefits and risks. Instead, it required doctors to provide information about
a range of nonmedical services and alternatives to abortion—nonmedical
services and alternatives provided by institutions and individuals entirely
unaffiliated with the doctors required to talk about them.39 The joint opinion
seems to assume that requiring medical providers to deliver additional
accurate speech about nonmedical services and alternatives informs, rather
than interferes with, pregnant women’s Due Process Clause rights.40
To be sure, the government serves women’s free speech as well as due
process interests when it requires speakers to inform women’s choices rather
35. Id. at 883, 887.
36. Id. at 882.
37. Id. at 884.
38. Id. But see Corbin, supra note 21, at 1191 (“A doctor’s right to control her speech
would seem quite distinct from a patient’s right to control her reproduction.”).
39. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
40. See Thomas B. Colby, The Other Half of the Abortion Right, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
1043, 1078 (2018) (“[T]he abortion right, in Casey’s reckoning, is primarily a right of
decisional autonomy.”).
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than deceive, bully, or coerce pregnant women into making a certain
decision. But that should be equally true of accurate speech about the
availability of abortion as well as about alternatives to abortion.
Moreover, the government threatens women’s free speech and due process
interests when it compels speech to pregnant women that is false, misleading,
or coercive. As legal scholar Jessie Hill points out, the government’s false
or misleading assertions about abortion’s health consequences do not inform
a woman’s choice but instead manipulate, and thus unduly burden, it.41 That
kind of speech undermines not only pregnant women’s Due Process Clause
interests in exercising a protected right free from the government’s undue
burden but also their First Amendment interests as listeners in receiving
accurate information that informs, but does not coerce or manipulate, their
decision-making.42
III. PREGNANT WOMEN HAVE FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS
IN RECEIVING ACCURATE, NONCOERCIVE SPEECH
THAT INFORMS THEIR REPRODUCTIVE DECISIONS,
INCLUDING SPEECH ABOUT THE AVAILABILITY OF
ABORTION AND OTHER PREGNANCY-RELATED
MEDICAL SERVICES
In Casey, the Court suggested that the government generally serves
pregnant women’s interests as listeners when it requires additional truthful
and not misleading speech, at least as long as that speech seeks to discourage
women from abortion. But, as evidenced by its decision in National Institute

41. B. Jessie Hill, Sex, Lies, and Ultrasound, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 421, 448 (2018)
(“[M]isleading or deceptive information cannot meaningfully serve the purpose of informing
a woman’s choice. And indeed, the available empirical evidence confirms that a woman’s
knowledge about the actual risks of abortion is decreased rather than increased by the sorts of
misleading information provided by the most recent spate of informed consent laws.”); see
also Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 648, 688 (2013)
(“Imagine for instance that the government positioned an employee outside the entrance to a
local abortion clinic, with instructions to shout at every woman entering the clinic, saying that
abortion is immoral and that she should immediately cancel any plans to end her pregnancy
through artificial means. Many people will have an intuition that an extreme form of such
action would offend due process.”).
42. Elsewhere the Court has recognized that the government’s expressive choices
sometimes coerce or manipulate listeners’ constitutional choices in violation of the Due
Process Clause. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court required law enforcement officers to
disclose available constitutional protections (like the right to remain silent and the right to
counsel) when interrogating those in the government’s custody. 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966).
By requiring the government to accurately convey listeners’ constitutional rights to them,
Miranda protected listeners’ rights to make informed and uncoerced choices about whether to
exercise or waive those rights. Id. To be sure, Miranda involved the most captive of
audiences—those in the government’s physical custody. Id. Health-care settings offer a less
extreme example. See Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994) (noting
that women seeking reproductive health care are sometimes akin to a “captive” audience
because of their medical circumstances).
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of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA),43 the Court views truthful
and nonmisleading speech that does not discourage abortion differently.44
NIFLA involved a Free Speech Clause challenge to a California law that
required facilities offering various services to pregnant women to disclose
certain information to those women.45 First, the law required licensed
facilities (those with licensed health-care professionals) to notify women that
“California has public programs that provide immediate free or low-cost
access to comprehensive family planning services (including all FDAapproved methods of contraception), prenatal care, and abortion for eligible
women.”46 Second, it required unlicensed facilities to notify women that
“[t]his facility is not licensed as a medical facility by the State of California
and has no licensed medical provider who provides or directly supervises the
provision of services.”47 From a listener’s point of view, this information is
helpful and relevant to her “mature and informed” decision.48 Note too that
the California law did not prohibit speakers from offering their opinions on
abortion or its alternatives; instead, it required speakers in certain settings to
disclose objectively verifiable—and subsequently valuable—information to
help those women make decisions.
But crisis pregnancy centers (CPCs)49 sued because they did not want to
disclose this information to the pregnant women whom they hoped to
persuade to continue their pregnancies to term.50 In a 5-4 decision, the Court
preliminarily enjoined California’s law, concluding that it likely violated
43. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
44. I have written about these issues elsewhere, and this Part draws from that work. See
Helen Norton, Powerful Speakers and Their Listeners, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 441 (2019)
[hereinafter Norton, Speakers]; Helen Norton, Taking Listeners’ First Amendment Interests
Seriously, FIRST AMEND. NEWS (Sept. 20, 2018), https://concurringopinions.com/archives/
2018/09/fan-200-first-amendment-news-helen-norton-taking-listeners-first-amendmentinterests-seriously.html [https://perma.cc/AFY6-ZXNX].
45. See generally Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. 2361.
46. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123472(a)(1) (2019).
47. Id. § 123472(b)(1).
48. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992) (“[W]e permit
a State to further its legitimate goal of protecting the life of the unborn by enacting legislation
aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and informed, even when in so doing the State
expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion.”).
49. CPCs are organizations generally affiliated with or operated by organizations that
oppose abortion. SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIV., MINORITY STAFF OF HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, FALSE AND MISLEADING HEALTH INFORMATION
PROVIDED BY FEDERALLY FUNDED PREGNANCY RESOURCE CENTERS 14 (2006). CPCs typically
offer a limited range of free services to pregnant women; few, if any, offer referrals or any
other services related to birth control or abortion, and many do not employ any professional
health-care providers. Id. CPCs’ critics assert that CPCs sometimes mislead or actively
deceive women. See id. (stating that certain pregnancy resource centers “frequently fail to
provide medically accurate information” and that “[t]he vast majority of pregnancy centers
contacted in this investigation misrepresented the medical consequences of abortion”); see
also First Resort, Inc. v. Hererra, 860 F.3d 1263, 1268 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing “[f]alse and
misleading advertising by clinics that do not provide abortions, emergency contraception, or
referrals to providers of such services”). None of the Court’s opinions (majority, concurring,
or dissenting) in NIFLA discussed this possibility.
50. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2370.
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CPCs’ free speech rights.51 In so holding, the majority did not consider what
information pregnant women as listeners would find helpful in making
important decisions about their health and lives and focused instead on the
centers as speakers and what information they did and did not want to provide
to the pregnant women they sought to influence.52 But the women as
listeners, like the CPCs as speakers, have autonomy, enlightenment, and selfgovernance interests at stake—the values at the core of the Free Speech
Clause.
In Casey, the Court held that both the Free Speech and Due Process
Clauses permit the government to require professional health-care providers
to deliver truthful, nonmisleading, and even nonmedical information to
pregnant women considering abortion when the government seeks to
discourage abortion through that speech.53 But that same Free Speech
Clause, the Court now tells us, likely forbids the government from requiring
professional health-care providers to deliver truthful, nonmisleading
information about the availability of alternative medical services, and it also
forbids the government from requiring nonprofessionals to tell the pregnant
women they seek to serve that that they are not health-care professionals.
More specifically, the NIFLA majority described its past precedent as
permitting the government to regulate professionals’ speech only in two
situations:
(1) when requiring “professionals to disclose factual,
noncontroversial information in their ‘commercial speech’”54 or (2) when
regulating “professional conduct [that] incidentally involves speech.”55 But
in describing, and distinguishing, this precedent, the majority failed to
acknowledge the key role played by listeners’ interests.
First, with respect to commercial speech, the majority described its past
deferential review of the government’s compelled disclosures as applying
only to “purely factual and uncontroversial” disclosures about the goods and
services that a commercial speaker itself provides.56 The majority then
distinguished California’s requirement that licensed facilities disclose the
availability of free or low-cost reproductive health care services (that
included but were not limited to abortion) because the disclosure concerned
the controversial subject of abortion and was directed to services that others
provide.57

51. Id. at 2376, 2378.
52. Id.
53. Casey, 505 U.S. at 883.
54. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (citing Zauderer v. Office
of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 657 (1985)).
55. Id.
56. See id. (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651) (applying the rational-basis test to uphold
commercial disclosure requirements that serve consumers’ interests as listeners).
57. Id. at 2371–72 (“The Zauderer standard does not apply here. Most obviously, the
licensed notice is not limited to ‘purely factual and uncontroversial information about the
terms under which . . . services will be available.’ The notice in no way relates to the services
that licensed clinics provide. Instead, it requires these clinics to disclose information about
state-sponsored services—including abortion, anything but an ‘uncontroversial’ topic.
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To be sure, crisis pregnancy centers do not want to say “either choice is
equally good” because they do not share that opinion on moral or religious
grounds. But apparently they also do not want to say that “California offers
low-cost or free family planning services, prenatal care, and abortion to
eligible Californians.” This is an objectively verifiable, empirically
uncontroverted fact. “[T]hat some speakers would prefer not to talk about
those facts—or would prefer that their listeners never learn of them—does
not make them ‘factually controversial.’”58
Moreover, common practice undermines the majority’s claim that
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel59 applies only to the speaker’s
“own services.”60 For example, some states require that health-care
professionals disclose information about lawful treatment options even if a
professional does not provide those services herself. Examples include state
and federal laws that require certain health-care providers and facilities to
inform patients or residents of their rights to execute advance health-care
directives, request palliative care, refuse potentially life-prolonging
treatment, or (in jurisdictions where lawful) to end one’s suffering with the
aid of a physician.61 And, as noted earlier, Casey itself upheld the
government’s requirement that health-care providers disclose the availability
of nonmedical services provided by others.62
Second, with respect to the regulation of professional conduct that
incidentally involves speech, the NIFLA majority noted that the First
Amendment permits the government to regulate professional conduct in
ways that include requiring speech by health-care providers to secure their
patients’ informed consent to a medical procedure. The majority then cited
the Pennsylvania law at issue in Casey as an example of the government’s
permissible requirement that physicians inform patients of the risks and
benefits of abortion as a medical procedure.63 But the Pennsylvania law
upheld in Casey required doctors to inform patients not only of the nature of
the procedure and the health risks of both abortion and childbirth, but also of
materials describing available assistance for continuing the pregnancy, such
as the availability of child support, medical assistance for childbirth, and
adoption services—information that is valuable to pregnant women but in no
way necessary to their informed consent to abortion as a medical procedure.64
In other words, both the disclosures upheld in Casey and those rejected
(preliminarily, at least) in NIFLA required health-care professionals to
disclose accurate information to pregnant women as listeners that is valuable
Accordingly, Zauderer has no application here.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)
(quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651)).
58. Norton, Speakers, supra note 44, at 467.
59. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
60. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2380.
61. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f)(1) (2012); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 1569.156(a)(3) (2019).
62. See supra notes 33–39 and accompanying text.
63. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2373.
64. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
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in decision-making but unnecessary for their informed consent to a medical
procedure. If we focus on listeners’ informational interests, then both
disclosures should be upheld. But while the Casey joint opinion interpreted
Pennsylvania’s law as requiring disclosures of “reasonable measure[s] to
ensure an informed choice, one which might cause the woman to choose
childbirth over abortion,”65 and held that the state was permitted to encourage
that choice, the NIFLA majority distinguished California’s notice as
something other than “an informed consent requirement or any other
regulation of professional conduct” and made no mention of the nonmedical
disclosures upheld in Casey.66
The NIFLA majority’s opinion centered only on the speakers and what they
did and did not want to say, entirely ignoring pregnant women’s First
Amendment interests as listeners.67 The dissent, in contrast, focused on the
information that pregnant women as listeners would find helpful in making
key, and constitutionally protected, decisions about their health and lives. As
Justice Breyer wrote:
If a State can lawfully require a doctor to tell a woman seeking an abortion
about adoption services, why should it not be able, as here, to require a
medical counselor to tell a woman seeking prenatal care or other
reproductive healthcare about childbirth and abortion services? As the
question suggests, there is no convincing reason to distinguish between
information about adoption and information about abortion in this context.
....
No one doubts that choosing an abortion is a medical procedure that
involves certain health risks. But the same is true of carrying a child to
term and giving birth. That is why prenatal care often involves testing for
anemia, infections, measles, chicken pox, genetic disorders, diabetes,
pneumonia, urinary tract infections, preeclampsia, and hosts of other
medical conditions. Childbirth itself, directly or through pain management,
risks harms of various kinds, some connected with caesarean or surgeryrelated deliveries, some related to more ordinary methods of delivery.
Indeed, nationwide “childbirth is 14 times more likely than abortion to
result in” the woman’s death. Health considerations do not favor disclosure

65. Id. at 883.
66. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2373 (“The joint opinion in Casey
rejected a free-speech challenge to this informed-consent requirement. It described the
Pennsylvania law as ‘a requirement that a doctor give a woman certain information as part of
obtaining her consent to an abortion,’ which ‘for constitutional purposes, [was] no different
from a requirement that a doctor give certain specific information about any medical
procedure.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 884)).
67. See id. at 2379 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“This law is a paradigmatic example of the
serious threat presented when government seeks to impose its own message in the place of
individual speech, thought, and expression. For here the State requires primarily pro-life
pregnancy centers to promote the State’s own preferred message advertising abortions. This
compels individuals to contradict their most deeply held beliefs, beliefs grounded in basic
philosophical, ethical, or religious precepts, or all of these.”).
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of alternatives and risks associated with the latter but not those associated
with the former.68

The NIFLA majority also preliminarily enjoined California’s requirement
that an unlicensed facility tell pregnant women that the facility is unlicensed
and does not employ health-care professionals.69 The majority declined to
decide whether to apply deferential review to California’s law, which would
be required if the law were characterized as requiring the disclosure of
“factual and uncontroversial” information.70 Stating that even under
deferential review such disclosures must be neither unjustified nor unduly
burdensome, the majority held that “California has offered no justification
that the notice plausibly furthers.”71
But the law’s justification is clear if we attend to listeners’ constitutional
interests—more specifically, the interests of pregnant women seeking
pregnancy-related services like prenatal care, postnatal support,
contraceptives, or abortion.72 Time is precious to most patients seeking
health care, and this is especially true for pregnant women.73 Delays create
new health risks, which limit and sometimes altogether foreclose certain
choices. When time is of the essence, listeners generally want more accurate
information rather than less, and they want it sooner rather than later. They
want to know what services a speaker does and does not offer and what
services are available elsewhere. When we take women’s interests as
listeners seriously, then we understand the First Amendment to permit the
government to require that speakers make such disclosures in settings where
listeners are especially likely to receive them.
CONCLUSION
Why should we privilege listeners’ First Amendment interests over
speakers’ in this setting? As I have written elsewhere:
When we take the side of listeners in these relationships—that is, when we
require more of speakers when their listeners lack information or power—
68. Id. at 2385–86 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,
136 S. Ct. 2292, 2315 (2016)).
69. Id.
70. Unlicensed CPCs did not want to tell pregnant women that “we are unlicensed” or
“we do not have any licensed medical providers here.” Surely these disclosures are factual.
And, as discussed above, the fact that the CPCs do not want to share these facts with pregnant
women should not make them controversial. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
71. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2376–78 (“We express no view
on the legality of a similar disclosure requirement that is better supported or less
burdensome.”).
72. This Essay explains why, from a listener’s perspective, Casey and NIFLA cannot both
be right. But even if we focus only on speakers’ interests, Casey and NIFLA cannot both be
right. From a speaker’s perspective, either professionals can make their own choices about
what to say so long as they provide the information required for informed consent (and both
laws fail First Amendment review because they compel professionals’ speech) or the
government can require professionals to give listeners truthful information on top of the
information required for informed consent (and both laws survive First Amendment review).
73. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011) (stating that medical
“information can save lives”).
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we improve the quality of the communicative discourse. More specifically,
we promote listeners’ First Amendment interests when we enable them to
receive accurate information that informs, but does not coerce, their
decision-making. We also achieve related moral goals: in Kantian terms,
we recognize listeners as ends in themselves, rather than as mere means
through which powerful speakers seek to achieve their own ends.74

Law sometimes privileges listeners’ interests over speakers’ in settings
outside of public discourse where the speaker has more information than the
listener and seeks to push her listener’s choices in her preferred direction75—
sometimes life-shaping choices about the listener’s own property or health.76
Think, for instance, of a commercial actor’s speech to persuade listeners to
buy what he’s selling. There, the Court’s commercial speech doctrine
permits the government to regulate false or misleading speech because such
speech frustrates listeners’ interests, and it limits the government’s ability to
regulate accurate commercial speech because such speech is valuable to
consumers as listeners.77 The government protects listeners in these
relationships by requiring comparatively knowledgeable speakers to provide
relevant and objectively verifiable information, thus enabling listeners to
receive accurate information that informs, but does not coerce, their decisionmaking.
For these reasons, as a doctrinal matter, listeners’ First Amendment
interests sometimes drive the Court to apply a different level of scrutiny to
the government’s regulation. For example, in some settings, the Court
applies rational-basis scrutiny to the government’s requirement that speakers
disclose factual information to inform listeners’ decisions.78 And listeners’
First Amendment interests sometimes explain why the government’s
regulations occasionally survive even suspicious scrutiny; in the campaign
finance setting, the Court has applied exacting scrutiny to uphold laws that
require political speakers and contributors to disclose themselves as the
source of campaign contributions and communications precisely because
74. Norton, Speakers, supra note 44, at 443.
75. The First Amendment implications of the government’s control over speech to
pregnant women seeking pregnancy-related services may turn on whether we consider a
woman’s reproductive decisions to be health-care decisions or political decisions. See Hill,
supra note 21, at 111 (“The framing of reproductive health care as a moral or ideological
choice and a matter of public concern rather than as private health care is significant not just
because it may shape the social meaning and public understanding of contraception and
abortion, but also because this framing arguably affects the outcome in First Amendment
disputes.”).
76. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Lies, Line Drawing, and (Deep) Fake News, 71 OKLA. L.
REV. 59, 75–77 (2018) (explaining that the government may have greater First Amendment
leeway to regulate speech that threatens harm to individuals or their property because of the
government’s traditional role of protecting the public); see also id. at 73 (“[T]he Court
generally divided activity between a realm of physical and financial interactions, where
government has a crucial role in securing safety and property, and a realm of ideas, where
government must generally let individuals shape their own thought free from government
interference.”).
77. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–64 (1980).
78. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
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those disclosures serve listeners’ informational interests.79 Either way,
listeners’ interests are part of the First Amendment analysis.80
What would the First Amendment law that applies to speech to pregnant
women look like if we considered the First Amendment interests of pregnant
women? It would require the government to identify itself as the source of
speech when it speaks to pregnant women about their reproductive decisions.
It would prohibit the government from requiring others who speak to
pregnant women about their reproductive decisions to deliver inaccurate or
misleading speech to those women. And it would permit the government to
require others who speak to pregnant women about their reproductive
decisions to deliver accurate and relevant information to those women, even
if that information does not discourage abortion.

79. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366 (2010); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (applying, and upholding, campaign disclosure requirements under
“exacting” scrutiny, meaning that the regulation must be substantially related to an important
government interest to survive review).
80. First Amendment doctrine that attends to listeners’ informational interests still leaves
those speakers free to make a wide range of expressive choices. It does not force speakers to
mouth opinions that they do not hold or state any untrue fact, nor does it prohibit them from
sharing their opinions or additional accurate information of their choosing in noncoercive
settings.

